Introduction
In Japan the issue of "weight of olle vote" has bC('1l COllt 1'01'ersial sincE' people began to recognize the gap between political constituencies with respect to the weight given to the number of seats per voter. In 198G our Suprellle Court gal'e a decisioll responding to the appeal that a gap of more than 2.0 mal' be lltlCOllstitutiollal. Siuce tlleu. sE'vera.! similar decisions have been given in various judicia.! courts. Om ruling Libera'! Democratic Party in the Diet has also recognized the importa.nct' of t his problem. It is considering reform of the election system, which has not been changed sinc(' the UJ.'iO's. Their plan includes reducing the total number of seats from the presellt 512. which was established in 1925. to 471 and accepting middle size electoral districtlllg syst em (the llumlwr of seats assigned to each constituency should be between :3 and 5).
Various types of "equity" problellls arise iu distri butiug Cl I·a.ila ble personllel or resources in "integral parts" to differen t su bdi visions. T,I :)ical exalll pies are the a.llocation of a set of available teachers to classE's in order to make timetablE'S. Ilw assignment of a set of individuals to certain jobs, which is the so-called classica.! as,ignment problem for operations researchers. and the distribution of seats in a legislature among different politica.! constituencies, Several solution methods have been proposed and establi,hed for some problems (e.g., the assignment problem), Others have not yet been "efficiently" solved (t.g .. the timetabling problem).
The apportionment problem a.ims at allocating seats "fairly" alllong political const;tuencies when the total number of seats and the di,tributioll of each cOllstituency's population are given. Mathelllatically, tlw apportiollllwnt. problem call 1)(' forlllltiated as follows : (~ivell the set of N political cOllstit.twllcies as .' ). = {l. 2 ...... Y}. tll(' populillioll of political constituency i E ::.:; as ]Ii. the t.otal pOPlIlatiull clS e. alld the totitlllllllJiwr of seats as h. ' . t.he "ideal" number of seats allocat.ed t.o the cOllstituellcy i. i.r .. tile "exact quot.a" </" is given (1. 5 ) and such that these parts c.re '"as near as possible" proportional. respectively. to a set of nonnegative integers {PI, P2, , , . , PN }.i .e., {ql. (12 ..... Cf,\, }. If the exact quotas {qj I I E S} were to be integers for a.ll i E.',", then the apportionment would 1)(' obtailwd by setting dj = q, for each i E S. But this is an extremely rare case, so uSllall,\' exact quotas {q, li E:: S'} all have fractional parts. Therefore, the problem becomes how to rOlllld the fractions {Ch li E S} to their "nearby" integral valUo's keeping their sum equa.] to a gin'll \'a.]lle h ..
The apportionment problem may seem to he an easily soh'ed '"approximation" problem. However, this is not the caSE as hist.ory shows. The Congress of the U nit.ed States, for example, has used four different :>ehemes to apportion the seats in the House of Representatives among the various states oV(~r the past 2UO years. and they have. on many occasions (beginning in 1790), held lengthy debates on this issue. General descriptions of the apportionment problem and its history are given in e.g .. [8. 11] .
Difficulties of the apportionnwn t problem occur Cl t s(-~\'''ra I points. Firstly. how should we express the measure of "Inequit.y·' to be l1linimized'? The}'e 111<1\' IWlIlall,\' definitions representing both global and local "inequities" bet.ween various ('()]}sl it lWllcies. These include minimizing the sum of differences betweeJl given apportioJllll(,llts a11(1 tlte exact quota of ead! constituency or minimizing "Iocally" relative differences of til(, 11llllIiwr of seat.s allocated per voter. Secondly, the difficulty of the apportionment problf'l11 is rf'la.tecl to the property which we want our apportionment. method to satisfy. For example. we want the apportionment method to ha.ve the property that the number of seats given to each constituency is either rounded-up or rounded-dowll by an exact quota or we ma~' wallt that a constituency should not be given less representation if the total number of seals illcreases and the distribution of the population of each constituency remains the same. There are various "natural" requirements for acceptable apportionment methods. Some of tlwse "requirement.s". however, are inconsistent. As yet, no method ha.s been found to sat.isfy them simultaneously in the general case. This means that no matter which apportiolllllent. method is accepted, it will possess certain "defects". Namely, we may have to decide in advance which properties must be satisfied, and which "defects" are acceptable before we employ our own apportionment method.
Ba.linski and Young ha\'e clone extensive work in the area of apportionment problems method. We show that our method is general enough to "cover" most traditional apportionment methods so far employed in several countries. vVe theu propose a range of appropriate parameter values for our apportionment method in order to maintain our method's impartialness and fairness with respect to the population size of each constituency. In Section 2 we review several representativE' apportionrnent methods and introduce the idea of a stable region related to certain locally optimal assignments. In Section 3 we look at those apportiolllnent methods from the viewpoints of cOllstrailwd optimization problems, then consider what kind of objective function these apportiollnlf'llt lllethods are trying to minimize. In Section 4 we expl"in our parCl\1lC'tric divisor method with its re\"tion to other methods. InScctioJl .5 we give' the results of our llunwrical cxperi Il1cnt.s lIsing .Japan's House of Representative data, and compare these results with the apportionment methods described therein. In the last Section, we conclude our pa.per by giving certain evaluations obtiLined from our ana.lysis and numerica1 experiments.
2. Apportionment methods and the stable regIOn 2.1 Traditional apportionment methods We expla.in several vel',)" common apportionment methods . . SOlIle of which aTe employed or have been employed in some European and Americall couutries. First, we will gi.ve a common scheme called the largest fractioll method. This scheme is based upon remainders. Next, we will show five divisor methods. These were baseciupoll divisors and go by the name of Huntington methods.
The largest fraction method, which we sha.!1 denote by LFM, was first suggested by A. Hamilton at the United States Congress in 1791, and was used by the Congress from 1851 until 1910. The LFlU first assigns each cOllstituellcy i E S' its lower quota lq;j, where lqJ denotes the largest integer less than or equa.! to q. Then we define the fraction of each constituency t, as follows.
Sorting the set {ti liE ,)'} from the largest. arbitrarily for tll<' equell elemellts, we define the set of suffices of the first J\' -LiES l q;J cOllstituellcies in tlw ordering by T. Then the LF M allocates an additional seat to the constituencies belongillg to tlw set T: namely, the whole allocation {di liE :n by the LFM is given as follows, 
where we permit dividing by 0 There exists an alternative way of expressing the general a pportionment methods based upon the rank function v{p;, d;) recursively. Let. df be the llumiwr of seats allocated to the political constituency i E S gl veil the total nUlllber of seats /,' E {O. 1. ... , !\'}. Then an iterative algorithm for the gen(,ral divisor method can 1)(' II'ritten as follows.
Step 2
.
Step 3 k = /,~ + where r qi 1 indicates the smallest integer larger than or equal to qi then method !vI is said to satisfy the upper quota. If method 1'1 satisfies both the lower and the upper quota properties, we say that method 1H satisfies the quota. Neither divisor method described above satisfies the quota property, while the LFM does satisfy it.
An apportionment method Ai is said to satisfy the hOllse 1ll0llo(one property if no political constituency i E 8 decreases its allocation when the house size increase:3 from k to k + 1. The violation of this property is often referred to as the "Alabama paradox". The word "Alabama paradox" originates from the fact that when (Ill' ll.S. Congress was using the LFlv! in 1881, the state of Alabama was allocated 8 rcpres('ntatiycs. while (lte.y received 7 when the total went to :300 from 290. Therefore. the L F.\J does not satisfy this property. All other divisor methods satisfy it.
Local measures of inequity
Now we focus upon the local measures of inequit\· Iwt\\'eeu pairs of cOllstituencies. Let the population in the constituency i E S' be Pi alld tIlt' nllllllwr of seats assigned be d,. We say that constituencyi is fayorecl over j whell the nUllllwr of s('ats per illcliviclua.l in the constituency i is greater tha1 or equal to that ill j; namel.\·. !lJ. :::: For example, the correspondence bet ween function EEP(P,. rI,: PI' ri,) and E P!1i is shown in the following theorem, which can be proved in a similar way to [So plUl]. [11, p378] . Theorelll 2.1 For the pair of constituenciesi and j with populatiolls p, and p)' apportionments di and dj, respectively, the following holds. 
Using thE' ahow' thE'OrPllL suppose that t.hE' rE'latioll (2.2:~) holds for all i E ,' :>' and j E S'. ThE'n thE' assignll1E'1l t. corn'sponds to t hE' optimal cOl1\·E'rgenl i1 pport.ioll mcn t. HE'Jlc(', comparing (2.23) or (2.241 with (2.7) or (2.D), WP can conclude tllat tlI(' aboVt' casE' in Theorem 2.1 is equivalent to the case that the divisor functic'n is gi veil as u( rI,) = d, (di + 1). In other words, the pairwise transfering procedure givell by the criteriOll in T leorem 2.1 gives the same apportionment solution as EPAl. Similarly, we can prow' that the measure of inequity functions EGD,E.~fF,EEP,EHM. and ESD are equi,·alent to G1JJ{,MFM,EPM,HA1M, and SDM, respectively.
From the computational points of view, pairl"ise comparisons are very illefficient since We probably have to consider each of the N(;\-l) combinations seyeral tirnes. The above (:'quivalent relations between measures of ineql;ity fULctions and rail!.: functions indicate that We can apply divisor methods to compute the appOl tionnwnt method based upon Huntington's criteria.
Huntington examined 64 different measures of inequity including :32 relative and 32 absolute differences (see [10] ). All of tlw relative differences alld two of the absolute differences lead to EP M. For example, if we c\enlw allotlH'· relati,·e diffcu'llces with respect to J~ and a.re also some absolute differences for which the ll1t'a"urc of ill('qui(,· fUlIctioll does not \\'ork.
In [10] an example of the lllf'(1S11rf' of inequity flll:ctioll E(jJj. ilj:
an unstable assignment appears is shown.
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Theorem 2.2 Let the measures of inequity be as follows.
Then the apportionment by the EP1\1 gives a stable solutioll when the Huntington's rule is applied to the above measures of inequity El and £2.
Proof By subtracting 1 from each of the functions El and L'J. we obtain the e:'1'or functions Then the apportionment b~' E P!lf gives a stable solu tioll WilCll H untington's rule is applied to the above measures of inequity £3 and £4'
The ARPT rule
We consider a new rule, which we call the average ratio pairwise transfer (ARPT) rule, for transferring a seat from one constituency to another. Our new rule provides deep insights to traditional apportionment methods and it is also ver~' useful for investigating our new apportionment method proposed later. Our ARPT rule is based upon the measure of inequity E(Pi, dl;pj, dj). Let T be the average number of seats j)f'r individual i.t.. " = If,, then the ARPT rule says that, for any two constituencies i and J' such tha.tiz. < r < &. we
PI
should make a transfer of one seat from the more fa vared cOllsti t uency i to the less favored constituency j if it reduces tile measure of inequity.
Our transfer rule is different from Huntingt.oll's Olle ill tltat IVP add a restriction ~ :::; r :::; ~, which possibly implies that our stable region is "IM!!,er tha.ll" HUlItillgt.on's one.
Applying ARPT rule to sew'ral types of measures of inequity. \H' can obtain the followillg theorems. In the following we always assume constituency i is faxo['ed o,,{'\' constituency j.
. } -. , :2
Pl .
if t > 0; = -1 if t ::; O.
Proof Since constituency i is favored over j', we have ~ < I" < !!i. So we need to consider
the following three cases (i)-(iii). In each case we sho\\' the condition that the measure of inequity a.fter a transfer of one seat from i to j is larger than or equaJ to that before the transfer. 
Therefore the relation (2.32) can be satisfied for any pajr of i and j in S. Hence the allocation given by the M F M is stable for the application of the ARPT rule. Applying the ARPT rule to the measure of inequity fumtioll defim'd by maximizing the absolute biases from the average ratios, we obtaiu the followillg results. whos\'· proofs a.re given in the Appendix. 
Corollary 2.7 Suppose that both of the two avportiolllllell t lllethods Cl D j)1 and S'D lVI
give an identical a;;signment of seats. '1'11('n it is a sta ble allocation for the application of the ARPT rule to the measure of inequity EM. The shaded areas in Fig. : 3 sen'e to illustrate Cl s\dbk It'gioll g)\TIl I)\" ("2.~IJ) dnd (2.41) on the X; -X.I plane. 
Global optimization aspects of apportionment methods
In this section we look at apportionment methods from the viewpoint of constrained optimization problems. In this respect, as far as we kllO\l", \"('ry few inyestigations have been done so far except that some preliminary results have been obtained and seen in [8, 11] . The various kinds of constrained optimization problems with respect. to the unknovvn variables {di liE S} have tIlt' same c<)nstraints as follows.
So from now OIl we abhrc\'iate the above constraillts. shO\\"illg ollly the objective function for each constrained optimization problem. First. t he following tlworem shows the constrained optimization problems for w hicb all optima.! soil! lioll is gi yen by the L F 1\11. The above theorem can be easily proved, so it is omitted here. Incidentally, the LPIv! gives an optimal solution to all constrained optimizat ion problems with objective functions with the form of lp-norlll of Id -ql (see [DJ) .
Regarding the GDM and the M FAI, we have the follo\\'iug results. 
Hence the following relation has to 1)1' satisfied.
The ahove inequality is equivalent to tlw following relatioll.
which is the max-min inequality that characterizes the G [ 
Hence there are two cases we need to consider.
Since k tJ. s+ U S-and I E .S+, we ha.ve
Hence we obtain
which is equivalent to (:3.1.5).
Case 2
Since k E S-and l tJ. s'+ U .';-. we hav~'
Hence we obtain which is equivalent to (:3.1.5) again. Th liS the criterion p.~ is sllOII"JI to be sat isfied by the CDJ';f. The case P.5 is equivalent to P4. 0
Similarly we can obtaill the following results whose proofs are given in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.3 The 111
Fkl gives an optimal solution for tIlE' following constrained optimization problems.
Theoren13. 4 The E P.M gives all optimal solution for the folloll"ing constrained optimization problem. Proof Let the constitucncv i be fa.vored over J., thcn we hill'<' ~ < 1" < ~. So we need to .
P; --jJ} consider the following cases (i)-(iii).
In each case we sho\\" the conditioll t.bat the measure of inequity after a transfer 01" one seat frolll i to j does llot cle("l"eC)se. 
cl;
cl, ri, -1
Summarizing the above results. we obtain the relations gin'll by (4. v p {+p.' which implies (4.13) for all pairs of i and j in S as given in Theorem 4.1. Thus the solution given by the P DJl1 is a stable allocation of seats for the applicatioll of the ARPT rule based upon the measure function (4.6). 0
Regarding the measure of inequity with the form
we obtain a stable region for the application of the ARPT rule including the state (pi, d;; PJ' dj) satisfying
The above condition is obtained by the H MM since its allocatioll satisfies the following relation. we obtain a. stable region satisfying
Suppose for a given parameter w such that 0 <I,) S I. we have 
Proof Criterion cf the problem PlO can be wri Hell as follows.
Hence mlmmlzmg the criterion (1.24) of PlO (4.26) Hence the following relation has to be satisfied for am' i. j E')·.
ji,
Pi
--' -< ---
Therefore, the above inequa.lity is eqlliva.lent to the follo\\'ing relation.
ma.x ~ < t1lin
Ji,
which is exa.ctly thE same criterioll as (4.'i) for t Iif' P D Jl . 
From (4.26) we have
Therefore, the inequa.lity (4.29) can be obtained jllst b\ adding ; ineqllaJities with the following form.
Thus the theorem is proved. o (4.:30 ) In the next section we investigate a PDN! df'scribecl ill (4.:3) using Japar\ HOR data, then compare this with other traditional apportionment met hod~.
NUluerical experiluents
Japan's House of Representative (HOR) has 1:.~U political constitucncies, each (CNST.) of which has a population (P PL.) and a current allocatioll (CHT) or l"f'presf'lltati\'es as showll in Table 2 .
Applying six apportionlllcnt methods (GDJ! . .\I F.I/. HP,I/. HJI M, SDM and
LF AI) to Japan':; HO R dat.a based upon the 1 ~)8.s Census. ,,'(' ohtaill the I"f'sults given ill Table 2 . First we recognize that J apa.n 's current allocation of 1-10 I{ seats t.o each constituency does not reflect the "proportionality to the population" and Illoreoyer smaller constituencies, which are mostly in rural a.reas, are favored over larger constituellcies, which are mainly in urban areas. The results in Table 2 vf or EP M, or between or around these methods. Applying the PDM given in section 4 to our HOR data we obtain the apportionment results as given in Table 3 using the values ot a new parameter 8, which equals 1-t in (4.3). The results in Table 3 indicate that the P D JJ with a smaller parameter value s is more favorable to larger constituencies while tha.t with a larger parameter value s is more favorable to smalle~' constituencies.
Comparing the results of Table 3 with the aJlocatioll by the LF AJ in Table 2 
A(x) -
and the distance between these two methods by
Obviously, the distance function is symllletric ~ !lee IA(.I") -.1(.11)1 = 1.4(.1/) -,-l(.r)1 amI it gives an even number since LL=l (iJ; -if) = o. ,I 
SUllllllary and conclusion
In this paper we proposed apportionment method P j) .11 based upon the parameter t given in (4.3) [8] says that the ,\1/-',\1 is the only unbiased divisor method, we believe that generally the At FA! is still more fa\'orable to larger constituencies since most numerical exampl,.':'; violate the quota. pl'Opnty (s('e t.y. [8. 12. 1:3, 14] ).
In conclusion, we believE' that the method LFIH. which of course satisfies the quota property, gives a most reasonable assignment of seats to the cOllstituency althougb it does not satisfy the house monotone property. We would like to SO we need to consider the followillg t\\'o cases (i)-(ii). III each case \\'e show the condition that the measure ·Jf inequity after a transfer of one sea t from i to j is larger thall or equal to that before the transfer.
Otherwise, i.e., fu. + ~ < 21' + .1. -.1.. we need to haye Otherwise, a trall3fer has to be made siuce /' > d,+1 > iL.
Otherwise, i.e., 1 
, the condition call be reduced to (AA).
Otherwise, a transfer has to be made since r < d,-l < !b..
p, PI
Summarizing the above two cases, if 
cl] --J Therefore the cOllditions of both (A.I) and (A.3) can be satisfied for all pairsi and j ill S. Thus the allocation gives a stable solution. (i)-(iii) in order t.hat a trander of one seat from Cl Itlore l'avored const.ituency i to Cl less favored constituency j should not decrease \ he measure of in<'q1Iity.
The above relation can be written as follows.
Hence using Xi ~ () a.nd '\-J :S 0, we obtain
Hence rewriting tlw above using Xi and X)' we obtaill 
Ci-2"
and we obtain the following relation.
for all i.j E S' _ 1
.\ i = cli -(1; < - Suppose that the constituencyi is favored over j, the inequality (A.17) can be written as follows.
The above inequality indicates that all optimal assiglllllPnt {il, I lE.':>'} satisfies Using the above relatioll and also using
we obtain the following. Thus we obtain the following. 
